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??British and U.S. Analyses of the Atlantic Charter
? ? The Atlantic Charter is the Anglo-American joint declaration in 1941 that stated 
a new world order to be realized after the war.???) Roosevelt, Churchill, and their two 
secretaries prepared the statement by themselves without consulting their home 
ofﬁces.???) So, foreign departments in both countries were to scrutinize their bosses’ 
pledge later to see how those ambiguous phrases would be interpreted in the policy 
planning.???) In this paper, discussion focuses on the British and American analyses of 
the Charter made soon after the declaration. 
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? ? When the Foreign Ofﬁce ﬁrst examined the terms to which they were committed 
in the late summer of 1941, it was from their recognition that to regard “vague 
and high-sounding phraseology as the basis of a legal document like a treaty” was 
dangerous. They knew it well from the history of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. 
They predicted that, when the war was over, “the nations of the world would appeal 
to the terms of the Atlantic Charter,” and “they would try to apply these terms 
according to their own interests, and the applications might bring serious difﬁculties 
and disputes.” Therefore, the Foreign Ofﬁce concluded that it was desirable to 
study the practical application of the Charter, be it in a tentative way due to the 
unpredictableness of the end of war.???)
? ? Interesting was the point about which the British ofﬁcers showed their concern 
in examining the terms of the Charter. They analyzed it “with special regard to the 
view which American opinion was likely to take of it.” In other words, the British 
were more worried about the cooperation with the U.S. than the possible problems 
that the two countries had to confront with. Though the British welcomed the Atlantic 
Charter as the “unspoken implication of American belligerency,” they recognized that 
the Charter implied “American claims to equal share in the determination of the 
postwar settlement.” If the U.S. demanded a predominant part in that work, the 
British thought that they would be “unable to refuse the demand, not only because 
the United States would come out of the war as the strongest and least exhausted 
Power in the world, but also because American assistance would be essential to the 
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execution and maintenance of a peace treaty.”  ???)
? ? The ofﬁcers examined the Charter point by point. On the ﬁrst point of the Anglo-
American desire of no aggrandizement, the Foreign Ofﬁce showed their concern about 
the possibility of the U.S. not understanding the need of “’protection’ relationship 
towards colonial or backward territory.” On the second and third points, the British 
doubted “whether American opinion understood the complexity of the political and 
geographical problems involved in the question of ‘self-determination’ in Europe.” 
Considering the need for maintaining friendly relations with the Soviets, for example, 
the British had prepared themselves for accepting the fact of the Soviet Union having 
absorbed the Baltic States. They thought that such a decision would be better “for the 
sake of the peace of Europe and our own wider interests.” Yet, the U.S. might refuse 
to give it formal recognition “on moral grounds while accusing us (the British) of a 
selﬁsh surrender of principle.”  ???)
? ? Difﬁculties in the fourth point of the economic matter were easily understood by 
the British ofﬁcers. They noticed that “the saving phrase about ‘existing obligations’” 
was inserted in consideration of the Ottawa Convention, but they also understood well 
that the U.S. had determined to return to pre-war condition of multilateral trading,” 
and would not let the British use the “saving phrase” longer than least necessary 
period. The British had no objection to the ﬁfth point on social security, except 
that they anticipated some difﬁculties in the “way of obtaining full international 
collaboration.”  ???) 
? ? On the sixth point that declared the ﬁnal destruction of the Nazi tyranny, the 
British were concerned about not the content itself, but degree of contribution that 
they could expect from the U.S. The Foreign Ofﬁce “did not think it likely that the 
United States would accept any responsibility for the territorial status of Europe, or 
be a party to a treaty which would automatically involve America in a war outside 
the western hemisphere.” Such prospect worried the British over the realization of 
the eighth point as well. The “kernel” of that “rather vague clause” was, they thought, 
to disarm Germany while the U.S. and Britain remaining armed. Yet, what is more, 
Germany needed to be kept disarmed, which was a more serious problem than taking 
arms away from their hands for a moment. How far the U.S. would assist in solving 
these problems, the Foreign Ofﬁce was not sure. The remaining point of the seventh 
was basically agreeable to the British policy.???)
? ? In the last part of the report, the Foreign Ofﬁce placed their view on the Charter 
from a broader point of view. According to it, what they resolved on applying their 
energies the most was, after all, the avoidance of the U.S. returning to isolationism. The 
Foreign Ofﬁce admitted that they “should have American support for the restoration” 
of those countries in Europe such as Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Poland. As the secondary measure when they could not easily get American assistance 
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in the political settlement, the British were determined to try to bring the U.S. into 
“close collaboration over economic reconstruction.” It was a “mistake” that the United 
States made large loans, without deﬁnite conditions, during the First World War, and 
such had to be prevented from repeating. 
? ? To secure the conditions of the world envisaged by the Charter, they recognized 
that they needed some “international organizations” such as an “international 
labour ofﬁce, an international bank, a disarmament commission,” and some kind 
of “international council” to give those organizations political direction and control. 
Yet, again, they came to a conclusion that “American participation in this Council 
would be essential,” and they thought that, “indeed without such participation we 
should not be able to enforce any settlement in Europe.” Therefore, they resolved 
that the Foreign Ofﬁce “should do what we could to bring before the American public 
the implications of the document” and explain ”that the means towards obtaining 
the desired aims of the Charter required an acceptance by the United States of the 
responsibilities of greatness.”  ???)
? ? After all, this analysis of the Foreign Ofﬁce brought out understanding that had 
existed among the British ofﬁcers. First of all, it showed that the British were worrying 
that the U.S. might not understand the complexity of the European problems, and 
that they might insist on the strict adherence to the Charter. The statement was 
meant to show the Anglo-American unity to the world, but the British were worried 
that Anglo-American disagreement might possibly develop over several points of the 
Charter in the future. Yet, at the same time, the British were well aware that the 
American cooperation was indispensable for the reconstruction and maintenance of 
the postwar world order. It seems that they understood the Charter as an American 
document that the British agreed to follow and as such considered it an important 
document to secure U.S. commitment to the postwar world. 
? ? Secondly, judging from their comment, the Foreign Ofﬁce seemed to have taken 
it for granted that the Charter would be applied only to Europe. Despite some phrases 
such as “all states” and “all nations” in the Charter, there was not a hint of doubt 
at the time among the British that it would possibly be applied to the nations all 
over the world. As will be shown later, such an understanding about the application 
accorded with that of Churchill.????) 
? ? Thirdly, in addition to the problem of the application of certain principles to 
particular regions, the Foreign Ofﬁce never expected that the Charter would be 
considered to be applied to the component units of the British Empire. Though the 
British mentioned the relevance of the Charter to colonial territories in their analysis, 
it was from their apprehension that the U.S. might not understand the colonial matter, 
and not that Great Britain was worried about the liquidation of the British colonies 
because of this endorsement of the principles of national self-determination. After 
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all, the ﬁrst response by the British Foreign Ofﬁce was, in general, rather optimistic 
about its application, and worried more about the concessions that they would have 
to make to the United States on other points. 
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? ? Not being at war, the U.S. was not required to rack their brains putting the 
principle into practice for a moment. Even though, the State Department had had 
great interest in the post war planning, and Harley A. Notter, who played an important 
role in the work of the post-war planning, and who later became the Adviser to the 
Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, made a detailed examination of the 
Atlantic Charter on September 11th.????)  
? ? What was notable in the Notter’s examination was that he viewed the Atlantic 
Charter as “the most recent and most important announcement of developing policy 
for reconstruction after the war,” and examined it point by point in the light of its 
practicability when put into practice.
? ? In examining the Charter, Notter, ﬁrst of all, described the ﬁrst point as “a self-
denying ordinance,” while admitting that it was a “condition necessary to give validity 
and moral strength to the remaining points,” and it also served the “strategical 
purpose of presenting marked contrasts” to the Hitler’s war and peace aims. At the 
same time, he pointed out some important issues that became controversial later such 
as whether or not the Charter might be inﬂuential on the British Commonwealth, 
the fate of the American strategic naval out-posts, and the interpretation of the 
territorial control of the enemy land after the war. In the end, he pointed out the 
difﬁculty “to abide by this principle,” and demanded “much skill in so adjusting new 
world relations…expedient as well as possible.”  ????)
? ? On the second point, Notter indicated the possibility to “break up large states 
and multiply the number of small sovereignties the world over.” At the same time, he 
warned that appropriate steps “must be taken” to assure that “there will genuinely be 
‘free expression.’” In his understanding, the point two “throws into the scope of great 
problems of concern to the United States the multiple, minutely difﬁcult territorial 
(and hence ethnic and economic and strategic) problems of the limits of all new, all 
restored, and some of the old states of the world.” On the third, he pointed out a 
pitfall that the U.S. herself might be trapped. For example, the principle of the self-
determination contained “an inconsistency” of not applying to the Axis countries. Also, 
there was no guarantee that “all” people may choose democratic self-government. 
As a whole, he was doubtful of the “actual extent of pledge or commitment in this 
statement of general principles,” and called attention to the necessity of such an 
examination.????)
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? ? As it often had been, the reservation of the fourth point became an issue in his 
examination. While showing some understanding toward his leader’s handling of the 
matter, Notter insisted that, if the reservation was implemented, the pledge of the 
realization of the liberal economy “will be subject to serious immediate, and perhaps 
permanent, limitations which may cause disappointment of aroused hopes.” Then he 
examined the difﬁculties predictable for the change of the economic custom in the 
world, and concluded that “there will presumably have to be devised effective forms of 
international administration of certain aspects of trade, purchase, and markets with 
power of enforcement.”  ????)
? ? As to the ﬁfth point, he took it as an “extension on a world scale of the more 
conservative principles of the New Deal.” Notter said that it was “signiﬁcant” that the 
two leaders “aspire to bring about such improvement in economic standards through 
‘collaboration between all nations.’ ” Yet, the description lacked in an explanation how 
the aim was pursued, and he saw more of the intention by the two leaders to “inspire 
hope among the peoples of the world now suffering under the deprivations of war,” 
than of an expression of a practical guideline for the social reform in the world.????)
? ? The sixth point that stated the Nazis’ destruction as a “necessary preliminary 
to peace and security” was a pledge, Notter explained, that Great Britain would 
“prosecute the war” and the U.S. “continue its assistance to Great Britain in the 
carrying out of this task.” Yet here again, he pointed out some of the vagueness in 
its expression, and stated that “it will arouse greater hopes than are likely to be 
fulﬁlled,” though the idea of the terms itself was “laudable.” As to the seventh point, 
Notter examined it from various aspects such as the U.S and the British intention 
of policing the oceans, relevance to the forth point of free access to the trade and 
material, international control of the seaways, and the problem of access to the sea 
for land-blocked nations. He proposed to pay careful attention to these matters.????)
? ? The last point of disarmament was regarded as a “means toward assuring 
peaceful peoples of freedom and of reducing the heavy economic burdens.” Looking 
back the history of similar attempt at disarmament, he thought that the task would 
not be easy. Yet, Notter indicated three new factors that would bring results different 
from those of the last world war, and that would contribute to the realization of 
disarmament. Those were, ﬁrstly, “the stated unwillingness of Great Britain and the 
United States to disarm until a working system of general security is established,” 
secondly, the vastly increased economic interdependence of the world,” and thirdly, 
the broadening and deepening of cultural understanding among peoples.”  ????)
? ? In the last part of his analysis, Notter added his overall view of the Atlantic 
Charter. The “vital importance” of the principle was, he explained, the fact that the 
U.S. “associates itself with Great Britain in guaranteeing fulﬁllment of the desires and 
promises for the post-war world expressed in the Eight Points.” Yet, when it came to 
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a question how fully did the principle constitute the “inclusive program,” he assumed 
that the Charter was “the object of a larger and longer perspective.” He pointed 
out that there were “certain grand omissions” from the Atlantic Charter, which he 
believed was indispensable, namely, an “orderly international administration with 
enforcement powers within.” This omission was the “most fundamental weakness” in 
the Charter. However, he agreed to the idea that “the contribution of this Government 
to the building of international stability and welfare must be in proportion to the 
responsibility which rests upon this nation,” and that responsibility was “heavier 
than rests on any other nation.” As for the reliability of his partner, Great Britain, 
Notter bluntly stated that “we can no longer place much reliance on Britain’s power 
on our side, for that chief associate of ours may have only declining strength to bring 
us.”  ????)
??
? ? In sum, there was grave distinction between the way the British ofﬁcers analyzed 
the Charter and that of the U.S. While the British were more concerned about degree 
of U.S. understanding of the European matter than with the difﬁculties of solving 
some problems in the Charter, the U.S. critically examined the contents, and called 
for attention to the incompleteness of the Charter as an inclusive program. As to the 
partners, the British were aware of the serious need of the American assistance for 
the handling of the postwar settlement. However, on the contrary, the Americans 
told themselves that it depended on the degree of their own efforts whether or not 
international stability and welfare would be established and maintained, and they 
did not place much expectation upon the British power.
The first in-depth study about the Atlantic Charter is by Theodore A. Wilson. His book is now 
a standard work on the Atlantic Conference, which produced the Atlantic Charter. He cites one 
chapter to narrate the birth of the Atlantic Charter. Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit, 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991). Robert Dallek cited a few pages for the discussion 
about the Conference and Charter in his work. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). This author 
discussed the Atlantic Charter in the context of Roosevelt’s handling of the foreign policies since 
the opening of the Second World War. Yui Hatcho, “the Atlantic Charter of 1941: A political Tool 
of Non-belligerent America,” the Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 14, 2003. 
The Atlantic Conference was held on Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in the strict secrecy. Those 
officers who attended were informed where they were heading at the last minutes.
British Cabinet had a chance to glance at some of the four drafts during the Atlantic Conference, 
but lower officers in the Foreign Office and the American State Department did not see any of 
them.
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